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Abstract
Substantial family and work macro-level change has been occurring in Japan. Examples include a
decline in the availability of jobs that afford lifetime protection against unemployment, an increase
in jobs that do not carry benefits such as a pension, an increase in age at marriage and at first birth,
and an increase in marital dissolution. Using life history data from the 2000 National Survey on
Family and Economic Conditions, young Japanese appear to have responded to these macro-level
changes in a fairly orderly manner. Marriage and childbearing have been postponed, but marriage
still precedes childbearing. Education is completed prior to starting work. For men, once work
commences they continue working. For women, the classic conflict between work and family
roles is evident. For men and women in both the family and work spheres Japanese young adults
have more orderly life course trajectories than American young adults.
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Introduction
Japan, along with all other countries that were both non-communist and industrialized by
1960, has experienced major change in both the work and family spheres. Painting with a
broad brush, changes in the work sphere have included an increase in jobs that require more
skills with a concomitant increase in educational attainment of young adults, an outsourcing
of high-pay low-skill manufacturing jobs to countries with lower wage levels, an increasing
globalization of economies, a reduction in jobs that have an explicit or implicit promise of
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lifetime employment, an increase in service jobs, an increase in employment opportunities
for women including career-type jobs along with an increase in the proportion of women in
the paid labor force, and a reduction in the likelihood that a parent will posses job-specific
skills and wisdom that can be passed on to sons and daughters. While the details vary, all of
these changes can be found in Japan, Western Europe, North America, Australia and New
Zealand.
In the family sphere, the changes, sometimes termed the “second demographic transition”
(van de Kaa 1987; Lesthaeghe 1995), have included, increasing participation of women in
the paid labor force, delayed marriage and parenthood, increasing levels of non-marriage or
never becoming a parent, increasing levels of non-marital fertility, cohabitation, divorce and
single parent families, and increased use of child care services to minimize the strain
between mother and worker roles.
These changes have been widely discussed (e.g. Bumpass 1990; Caldwell 2004; Inglehart
1977, 1990; Lesthaeghe and Moors 2000; van de Kaa 1987, 2001). Their implications are
profound for both the family and the economy. For example, because of increases in
unmarried childbearing and divorce in the U.S. a higher proportion of children spend time in
single-parent families, and there is now widespread agreement that children in a single-
parent family are at a disadvantage relative to their peers in two parent families (Brown
2004; DeLeire and Kalil 2002; Hill, Yeung and Duncan 2001; McLanahan and Sandefur
1994), though interpretations differ concerning the magnitude and mechanisms of the
effects. Or to take another example, low levels of fertility, related to both timing and number
changes (Bongaarts and Feeney 1998; Billiari and Kohler 2004; Frejke and Sardon 2004;
Lesthaeghe and Wilson 1999), as well as changing marriage propensities, have led to
population aging (Dang, Antolin and Oxley 2001; Keilman 1997; Lee and Miller 2002;
Lutz, O'Neill and Scherbov 2003; National Research Council 2000; Tuljapurkar, Li and Boe
2000), which, in turn, threatens old-age support systems and public health care expenditures
that are based on intergenerational transfers (Bongaarts 2004; Gruber and Wise 1999; Lee,
Mason, and Miller 2003; McDonald and Kippen 2001). Low levels of fertility combined
with migration restrictions have led to the onset of population decline in Japan and imminent
decline in several European countries (Sardon 2004), but opinions differ with respect to
whether this is a problem or a benefit (e.g. Morgan 2003).
These broad work and family changes have affected the life course of young adults:
expanding the time spent in school, delaying entry into full-time employment, delaying
marriage and parenthood. The changes have also increased the opportunity for changes in
the order in which events occur in the life courses of young men and women. In some
countries, for example, many young adults are now in school at ages when marriages and
childbearing traditionally occurred, changes in economic opportunities allow young women
to become mothers before becoming wives, and returning to school for additional education
has become commonplace.
Rooted in socio-cultural theories of age and social relations (Elder 1998; Elder, Johnson and
Crosnoe 2004; Ryder 1965), the life course perspective refers to a sequence of socially
defined, age-graded roles that the individual occupies over time. A set of components of the
life course framework revolve around the timing of roles and role transitions, as well as the
order in which they occur. Most societies have expectations about the timing of the adoption
of such adult roles as worker, spouse and parent, and hence the timing of role transitions can
be thought of as early, on time, or late (Elder 1998; Riley, Johnson and Foner 1972;
Rindfuss 1991; Settersten 2004).
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This paper examines the timing and patterning of young adult roles for one country, Japan,
and makes comparisons with existing work on the United States, and to a lesser extent
Norway. In the next section we describe why Japan is of interest in terms of the changing
work and family situation. This description is at the macro level, using published, aggregate
statistics. In the micro-level empirical work in this paper, the timing of work and family
transitions is examined, followed by a demonstration of the diversity of young adult
trajectories. We then show that the life course trajectories of young men and women tend to
be orderly, that is, they exhibit a pattern that follows normative expectations. To preview our
results, we find the work and family life-course trajectories of young adult Japanese to be
very orderly, with “order” being defined by traditional expectations in the work and family
spheres, and much more so than in either the U.S. or Norway.
Japan
Japan differs strikingly from many Western post-industrial societies. Consider the work
sphere first. Schools play a more important role in obtaining a job (Inui 2003; Ishida 1998;
Ishida, Spilerman and Su 1997). For most of the past 40 years, the “new graduate
recruitment system” has been the principal mechanism whereby young Japanese men and
women obtain a job. Under this system, schools (both high schools and universities) act as
middle-men in the recruitment process for “regular” jobs, that is jobs that offer fringe
benefits and fall under the lifetime employment model. If a young person finishes school in
a year when economic conditions are such that there are few full-time job openings, he or
she might be forced to take a job without benefits, security and job advancement
possibilities. This can have long-term implications because when the economy rebounds
employers will prefer hiring new graduates.
The nature of the Japanese economy and the types of jobs available to young people has
been changing. Growth slowed markedly in the 1990s largely due to the after-effects of
over-investment during the 1980s (popularly called the "bubble economy") and domestic
policies intended to wring speculative excesses from the stock and real estate markets
(Cargill, Hutchison and Ito 1997: 91–116). Initially, government efforts to revive economic
growth were met with little success and were further hampered by the slowing of the global
economy in 2001–2002 (Cotis 2003; Yoshitomi 2004). Beginning 2003, the Japanese
economy showed signs of a strong recovery until the recent worldwide economic crisis
triggered by problems in the U.S. financial system.
Concomitant with rapid economic growth in postwar Japan, educational levels and paid
employment (as opposed to employment in family enterprises) have increased dramatically,
along with the educational requirements of most jobs. Such gains have been especially
dramatic for women: the proportion of women age 25–29 with more than senior high school
education increased from 10 percent in 1970 to 49 percent in 2000 (National Institute of
Population and Social Security Research 2005: 149). During the same period, the labor force
participation rate of women age 25–29 increased from 45% to 70% (National Institute of
Population and Social Security Research 2005: 137).
In an attempt to increase their competitiveness and profitability, employers have begun to
move away from the lifetime employment model (Boling 2008). This resulted in the rise of
employees working in temporary positions as keiyaku (those hired under a fixed-term
contract with limited provisions of social insurance and other fringe benefits) and haken
(contract work whereby an agency sends workers to a corporation for a specified period)
(Statistics Bureau 2001). These non-regular workers tend to be young: 61% of those
employed as keiyaku or haken in 2005 were aged 15–34 (Statistics Bureau 2005).
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Another phenomenon in the Japanese labor market is an increase of so-called “freeta,”
young people (age 15–34) who do not hold a stable job and hop from one short-term
temporary job to another (Statistics Bureau 2005). The proliferation of temporary
employment among young adults not only harms their job prospects, but also poses
profound implications for marriage and family building (Oppenheimer 1994; Oppenheimer,
Kalmijn and Lim 1997; Tsuya 2009).
A final, related but different, trend has been an increase in young adults who are neither in
school nor in the labor force. Borrowing a term that originated in the United Kingdom, the
Japanese government began measuring the number of “NEETs” (Not in Education,
Employment or Training) in 2000. The number of NEET, defined as those aged 15–34 who
are not employed, not in school, and never married is increasing rapidly. Based on the
population censuses, it is estimated to have increased 2.6 times from around 290,000 in 1995
to 750,000 in 2000, constituting a little over 2% of the population of that age group. The
number is projected to rise to around 1.2 million by 2020 (Kadokura 2004).
It is important to recognize that Japan shares a Confucian familial-cultural heritage with
other countries in East Asia, such as South Korea, China and Taiwan that have been
undergoing rapid industrialization in recent decades (e.g. Brinton and Lee 2001; Chang and
Lee 2006; Goldstein and Feng 1996; Mason, Tsuya, and Choe 1998; Peng 1991; Thornton
and Lin 1994; Tien 1984). A significant component of the Confucian influence is the
emphasis on filial piety and the importance of the patrilineal line (Aruga 1943; Otake 1982;
Tsuya et al. 2004). The traditional Japanese family system, called ie, dating from at least the
Meiji era (1868–1911), is based on patrilineal descent, patriarchal authority, and patrilocal
residence (Fukutake 1989; Ishihara 1981). The government's system for registering legal
residence (koseki) keeps track of lineages, and in Japan's birth registration system children
born to unmarried mothers are still officially referred to as “illegitimate children” (hi-
chakushutsu-shi), a stigma with negative consequences for children. Both this tradition and
the koseki system likely influence the probability of non-marital fertility.
With respect to marriage, it is helpful to think of post-war marriage as a “package” to
highlight the culturally defined linkage of marriage, childbearing, childrearing and
frequently care of elderly parents of the husband (Rindfuss 2004; also see Coleman 1983), in
what was expected to be a life long commitment. Further, the burden of household tasks
falls overwhelmingly, and some would say “exclusively,” on the wife (Ishii-Kuntz and
Maryanski 2003; Tsuya et al. 2005). With increases in education and employment
opportunities for young women, the attractiveness of this marriage package has likely
declined because upon marriage, traditionally, wives were expected to cease their
employment and were to devote themselves full-time to household tasks. The very dramatic
decline in marriages in the young adult years reflects the relative attractiveness of
employment opportunities, the concomitant unattractiveness of the traditional marriage
package, and, as we discuss next, the advantages of remaining single (Raymo and Iwasawa
2008). For example, among women aged 25–29 in 1975, only 21 percent were never
married; by 2005, the comparable figure was 58 percent (National Institute of Population
and Social Security Research 2007a: 109).
Among never-married young adults, co-residence with parents is very common. In 1994, 82
percent of single men and women aged 20–28 lived with their parents (Tsuya, Mason, and
Bumpass 2004); the corresponding proportion was 86 percent in 2004. Since young men and
women are often not expected to financially assist the household even when they are
employed, these unmarried young adults tend to have substantial disposable income to use
for travel, shopping or whatever else they desire, which also likely decreases the
attractiveness of the traditional marriage package.
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Also indicative of a questioning of the marriage package is evidence that divorce
probabilities have been increasing. They are now at implied cumulative levels of about 30%
within 20 years of marriage (Raymo, Iwasawa and Bumpass 2004).
Unlike the pattern found in Western countries when age at marriage increased, Japan has not
witnessed a large increase in nonmarital fertility. Nonmarital births account for
approximately 2 percent of all births (National Institute of Population and Social Security
Research 2007b: 67), which is far lower than any Western European nation (Sardon 2004).
With an increase in age at marriage and no substantial increase in nonmarital fertility, levels
of period fertility have declined substantially. Japan experienced a dramatic decline in
fertility shortly after World War II. In one decade the TFR dropped from 4.5 to 2.0. It was
then stable in the 2.0 to 2.2 range for nearly two decades. In 1975 it began to decline again,
reaching a low of 1.26 in 2005 (Statistics and Information Department 2006). Further, the
proportion of couples who had their first child by the end of their second year of marriage
has been decreasing since the mid-1970s, indicating a weakening of the tendency of couples
to have their first child soon after marriage (National Institute of Population and Social
Security Research 2006: 34).
To summarize, in Japan, there has been considerable macro change in the educational and
employment environments, with young men and women staying in school longer, starting
their careers later and facing structural changes in the workplace, along with a pattern of
delayed marriage and childbearing in the family sphere. In the face of such macro change,
how are young women and men constructing their life courses, within the work sphere, the
family sphere, and across the two? To answer this we turn to micro-level data.
Data and analytic issues
The micro-level data for this paper are from the National Survey on Family and Economic
Conditions (NSFEC) in Japan which was conducted in November 2000. The NSFEC is a
national, two-stage stratified probability sample of Japanese men and women aged 20–49.
First, three hundred fifty locales were randomly selected based on 2000 census data, and
then individuals aged 20–49 were randomly selected within each locale based on the basic
registration of its residents. Because the general objective of the survey was to collect
information on role transitions over the early adult life course, individuals aged 20–39 were
selected at twice the rate of those aged 40–49. (Further details on the data set can be found
in Rindfuss et al. 2004.)
Life history data was collected for a number of domains, including education, employment,
marriage and childbearing. The fertility data was collected via standard questions that asked
if the respondent had any children, and if yes, their dates of birth. Unfortunately, only ever-
married women were asked the fertility questions. This means that there may be some
respondents in our data set who have never married and have had one or more children.
Since one of the issues we address is the order of events in the family sphere (marriage and
childbearing), this means that we are underestimating non-marital childbearing. How much
might this affect our results? We expect the answer is “a little, but not enough to influence
our overall conclusions.” Based on Japanese vital registration data, non-marital childbearing
is exceedingly rare relative to other low fertility countries; since the early 1950s, only about
1–2 percent of all births have been non-marital (National Institute of Population and Social
Security Research 2006: 67). Ever-married women could report non-marital births on the
NSFEC, and they do so at a level one would expect given the low proportion of non-marital
births in Japan. So, in interpreting our results it will be important to remember that non-
marital births are underreported, but the magnitude of underreporting is unlikely to affect
our broad conclusions.
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For the other domains, data comes from a table that the respondents filled out. The rows in
the table were activities such as going to school, working full time, and so forth. The
columns were calendar years, beginning with 1980 and ending with 2000. For each activity
they were instructed to “circle the year the activity began, and the year it ended. Then draw a
line connecting the two circles. Do this for as many times as you started and ended the
indicated activity. If you stopped one activity for a while and started it again in the same
year, draw two circles in the year. Leave the row blank if you have not done the activity or
behavior.” Our pretests indicated that respondents had no trouble understanding the
instructions and filling out the matrix, and experience in the actual survey confirmed this.
The data available for analysis are illustrated in Chart 1, where the columns indicate birth
cohort (or age in 2000) and the rows represent activity years from 2000 back to 1980. The
entries in Chart 1 show the age of a respondent in a particular activity year given their birth
cohort. We are interested in the sequences or trajectories of roles occupied during the young
adult years. It can be seen that if we were to look at ages 20 through 40, there is only one
cohort (1960) in our data set that spans the entire 21 years. On the other hand, if we wanted
to examine just the sequences of roles occupied between age 25 and 29, a span of 5 years,
we would have complete information for cohorts 1955 to 1971, 17 cohorts. We are
interested in the young adult years, which are demographically dense when people are
making the transition from student to worker and from family of orientation to family of
procreation. Balancing our substantive interests and our methodological preferences for
sample sizes as large as possible, we look at the experience of two different groupings of
cohorts (1960–1970 and 1955–1965). While largely overlapping, these two groupings allow
the observation of different segments of the young adult life course: 20–30 and 25–35
respectively. This experience can be seen in the shaded portions of the top and bottom
panels of Chart 1.
Two aspects of the data warrant further discussion. First, with such a limited set of cohorts
we cannot carefully examine cohort change; we simply do not have data for enough cohorts
for long enough portions of their life course. Hence the “change” in the title of this paper
(Order admidst change) does not refer to cohort change; rather the “change” refers to the
macro-level, transformational changes in the work sphere that have occurred in Japan as
discussed above. These are changes that, other things being equal, would be expected to
influence life course event, timing and sequence. So what we examine is the behavior of
individuals as they live their lives during a period of rapid change at the macro level. In
future work we plan to explicitly examine cohort change.
Second, it is important to note that our data are yearly rather than monthly2, and this has
both advantages and disadvantages. The principal advantage is that it allows us to “see” the
main features of young men and women without being distracted by short-term fluctuations.
And these main features are probably the ones best remembered by respondents. The
disadvantage is that yearly data probably produces more orderly life course trajectories, and
this will need to be remembered in interpreting our results – a topic to which we return
below.
Timing of events
We begin by examining the timing of events: when do young adults finish school, first
marry and first become a parent. Table 1, based on life table estimates, shows the
cumulative proportion having left school, married and a parent for ages 18, 21, 25, and 30.
Overall, people leave school at a relatively early age while marrying and becoming parents
2The exception is that we have monthly data for date of first marriage and the dates of birth of the first four children.
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at a relatively late age, leaving, on average, a relatively large number of years between the
start of adult employment commitments and the start of adult family responsibilities. Put
differently, young Japanese men and women have many years of earning a salary or wage
before they take on spouse and family responsibilities. This reduces the demographic density
of the young adult years, and also is related to the relatively low level of fertility that
currently exists in Japan.
Women finish school, marry and become a parent at younger ages than men. For example, at
age 21, three-quarters of the women had left school compared to approximately three-fifths
of the men. Given that education has increased more rapidly for women than men in recent
cohorts, this gender difference in school-leaving age has probably declined in more recent
cohorts. By age 25, almost half of the women had married compared to a quarter of the men.
And by age 30, 56 percent of the women had become a parent compared to 37 percent of the
men.
Trajectories
The life table results in Table 1 provide an opportunity to examine the timing of events, but
they do not provide a clear overview of the life course experience of young adults, and to
better understand the flexibility or rigidity of the young adult life course one needs a more
holistic approach. Put differently, the life table approaches, as well as its multivariate
variations such as event history analysis, allow one to focus on an event (e.g. a birth, a job
start) and the reoccurrence of that event, but even with strong assumptions about causality
they do not show how the event in question relates to other events in the person's life. (For
discussion of the issues and some methods to overcome limitations of the life table approach
see: Billari and Piccarreta 2005;Taris and Feij 1999;Wu 2000.) Our approach to obtain an
overview or holistic understanding of the life course of young Japanese men and women is
what Billari and Piccarreta (2005) term “frequency distributions of sequences.” We first
divide events and states into the family sphere (marriage and parenthood) and the work
sphere (education and employment). Consider the family sphere first, and the eleven years
of the life course between ages 20 and 30 (panel A of Chart 1).
In the family sphere, we have three marital statuses, never married, married and post-
married (separated, divorced or widowed) and two parenthood statuses, not a parent and
parent3. Cross-classifying these two statuses results in six possibilities:
1. never married, not a parent
2. never married, parent
3. married, not a parent
4. married, parent
5. post-married, not a parent
6. post-married, parent.
In each of the eleven years, a person is classified into one of these six possibilities. Stringing
together the eleven classifications results in a sequence or trajectory that captures, with a
yearly rather than a monthly or daily brush, that person's family experience during the time
they were 20 to 30. So, for example, a person who remained unmarried and not a parent
throughout the eleven years would have this sequence:
3The parenthood state does not have an exit status comparable to “post-married.” Once someone becomes a parent, they stay a parent.
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Or to take another example, a person who married when they were 23, became a parent
when they were 27, and stayed married would have the following sequence:
(2)
These two examples represent very different experiences. Someone who married at age 24,
became a parent at age 27 and stayed married would have the following sequence:
(3)
Sequences 2 and 3 are different, but quite similar to one another. In the next section we
examine one aspect of similarity, but it is important to recognize that there are numerous
other aspects of similarity that we do not examine.
In the work sphere, we have in school or not, employed part-time or not, and employed full-
time or not. Since these can be combined in every possible way (for example simultaneously
working a full-time and a part-time job), we have eight categories:
1. just in school
2. in school and employed part-time
3. in school and employed full-time
4. in school, employed part-time, and employed full-time
5. not in school and not employed
6. not in school and employed part-time
7. not in school and employed full-time
8. not in school, employed part-time, and employed full-time
We begin our analyses of these work and family trajectories by asking a few simple logical
questions which are contained in the column headings in Table 2. The first thing that is
evident is that there are a relatively large number of unique sequences. The average number
of respondents per trajectory ranges from 3 to 14. For every possible comparison, in the
family sphere and the work sphere, at ages 20–30 and 25–35, there are more sequences for
women than men. Part of the reason is that there are more women in the sample than men,
itself a function of higher response rates for women. But differences in number of
respondents are only a small piece of the explanation. The bigger issue, to which we return
below, is the gender differences in the way that work and family spheres impinge on one
another, an indication of which is the very large disparity in the number of sequences in the
work sphere for men and women.
For every paired comparison in Table 2 except one, there is a greater diversity of sequences
in the work than family sphere. This is partly a function of more categories in the work
sphere, but that is not the complete story. It is also partly a function of delayed marriage and
childbearing past age 30 and 35, but, again, that is not the complete story. For women,
again, the likely explanation is balancing work and family roles.
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Table 2 also shows the number of sequences that are occupied by only one person. Similar
patterns are seen. Women have more one-person sequences than men, and the work sphere
has more one-person sequences than the family sphere. In the work sphere, approximately
three-quarters of the sequences are occupied by one person.
Chart 2 shows the trajectories with the highest percentage of respondents for each gender
and age combination. In the work sphere, employed the entire 11 years is most common for
both ages and genders, but the percentage is substantially higher for men than for women,
with the difference especially striking for the 25–35 age group. Also for women for ages 25–
35, almost as many are not in school and not employed the entire 11 years, again reflective
of the conflict between work and family roles for women.
How do these patterns compare to experience in other countries? The only comparison of
which we are aware is for the United States using data from the National Longitudinal Study
of the High School Class of 1972 (Rindfuss 1991). The ages covered were 18–29, and there
were three work categories: school, employed and other, with the analysis forcing
respondents to be in just one of these three possibilities in any year. So the comparison
involves numerous differences. Given these differences, it is interesting that the most
common sequence is being employed all 12 years and that about three quarters of the work
sequences have but one person in them – results identical to those in Chart 2.
Order and disorder
Parents, teachers, employers, and society in general have expectations about desired or
preferred employment and family trajectories for young adults. These expectations partly
stem from concerns that some trajectories might have negative consequences for the young
man or woman. An example might be a young unmarried person who has stopped their
education but is not employed, either full- or part-time. The parent would worry about the
implications for the person's career and perhaps his or her marriage prospects. The teacher
might worry whether the person is living up to his or her potential. A prospective employer
might worry about the work habits of such a person. Expectations also stem from everyday
observations of friends, relatives and acquaintances who successfully navigate the young
adult years. Expectations can also be influenced by various media reports.
The various expectations of individuals in a society combine at the macro level to form
norms about preferred young adult sequences. We recognize that norms about preferred
sequences are notoriously difficult to define and measure (Hogan and Astone 1986;
Neugarten and Datan 1973; Settersten 2004), and we do not attempt to do so here. Instead,
we present disaggregated categories.
We use the term “order” to describe those sequences that follow the expected or normative
path, and “disorder” for those that do not. Unfortunately, in everyday use, “disorder” has a
judgmental connotation. We are not using it in a judgmental fashion, but simply refer to the
extent to which the sequence is the expected path from the perspective of either work or
family spheres. Indeed, as we discuss below, for women, what might be described as a
disorderly work sequence from the perspective of the work sphere might also be judged as a
preferred sequence from other perspectives.
In the family sphere, the normative sequence is to become a spouse before becoming a
parent. The reverse is disorderly. In Japan, marriage has long been expected to be a life-long
commitment, for the sake of the marriage and for the children. We have three categories of
disorder or possible disorder: non-marital birth, a marital dissolution that occurs prior to
becoming a parent, and a marital dissolution that occurs after becoming a parent. If someone
has both a premarital birth and then a marriage followed by a marital dissolution (that is, two
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forms of disorder), they are left in the non-marital birth category because the traditional
normative expectations against non-marital births are thought to be stronger and more strict
than against marital dissolution in contemporary Japan.
From the perspective of the work sphere, it is normative to finish school, start working, and
work throughout the young adult years. Spending time neither working nor in school would
be considered disorderly. Having an interrupted educational career would generally be
considered disorderly. But taking some type of advanced schooling while simultaneously
holding a job might be considered orderly, especially if the additional schooling is at the
request of the employer. Thus, we distinguish between two types of educational breaks. The
years between a break in education might also be years in which the person is not working;
in this case not-working takes precedence in classifying the sequence.
“Disorder” here is defined in terms of the work sphere, and the logic is that sequences which
might have a negative impact on a person's occupational or income trajectories, or make it
more difficult for the person to find the type of employment they desire are considered
“disorderly.” For example, dropping out of the labor force for a few years and then returning
tends to result in penalties in terms of wage rates and promotion to higher level jobs. Indeed,
this is a major finding and issue in the gender stratification literature in economics and
sociology (e.g. England and Folbre 2005). Or to take another example, in Japan schools play
an important role in placing individuals in jobs (Inui 2003; Ishida 1998; Ishida, Spilerman
and Su 1997; Kerckhoff 1995). Schools frequently act as go-betweens in the recruitment
process for “regular jobs” – jobs that are considered full-time, offer fringe benefits and fall
under the lifetime employment model. Schools help in getting a first job, but if someone
drops out of the labor market and then wants to return, schools will be unlikely to help and
the person returning will likely have a more difficult time obtaining the job they desire.
For men, from almost any perspective, labeling dropping out of the labor force and then
returning as a “disorderly” young adult sequence would seem reasonable. For Japanese
women, however, from the perspective of her spouse, her parents, her other relatives, or her
friends, dropping out of the paid labor force when she has young children probably would be
considered the expected, preferred or “normal” sequence. This terminological issue with
respect to a common employment sequence for Japanese women goes to the heart of the
difficulty Japanese women have in balancing work and family expectations/responsibilities.
This is an issue to which we return below. For now, remember that we distinguish between
orderly and disorderly work sequences from the perspective of the work sphere.
Table 3 shows, for men and women, the extent of order or disorder in the family sphere for
both the 20–30 and 25–35 age components of the life course. The most striking aspect of
Table 3 is the dominance of order in family sequences. In every age and gender group it is
over 90 percent. This is a function of low rates of non-marital fertility and divorce. It is also
increasingly a function of later ages at marriage and parenthood. If you are not married and
not a parent, by our definition it is an orderly sequence, but remember that never marrying
and never becoming a parent would be frowned upon by traditional family standards.
How might this compare to other countries? Again, we do not have data sources that provide
an exact comparison, but for women we can compare our results to results from Upchurch
and her co-authors (2002) with respect to the order of leaving school, marrying and
becoming a parent. The data sets, time period and restrictions are not strictly comparable,
but close enough to permit a coarse comparison. They use data from the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). They use women who were aged 26–33 in 1991,
examining their behavior from the teen years until 1991. The NLSY data are monthly rather
than annual. Monthly data are more likely to reveal disorderly sequences than annual data,
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and so we would not want to interpret small differences between NLSY and NSFEC. The
contrast between the United States and Japan in Table 4 is stark, and very unlikely to be
entirely the result of differences in the nature of the two data sets. Among Japanese women,
99 percent are in the three categories that might be considered orderly sequences involving
school, marriage and parenthood: 1) stop school, marry and have a child, 2) stop school,
marry, but not yet a parent, and 3) stop school, not yet married and not yet a parent. The
comparable number for the United States is 61 percent. We also note that the total fertility
rate in the United States has been hovering around the replacement level while Japan's has
only been about two-thirds of the replacement level. As we discuss below, we expect that
the family sequencing flexibility in the United States facilitates higher levels of period
fertility, allowing women to have children at younger ages.
Order or disorder in the work sphere is shown in Table 5. There are two distinctive features
of Table 5. First, breaks in schooling, that is, leaving school, doing something else for a
while and then returning, are exceedingly rare. This reflects the tracked and ordered nature
of the Japanese educational system, and the importance of entrance exams (Brinton
1990,1992;Tsuya and Choe 2004). Once one leaves school, it is very difficult to be
readmitted. In this way, the Japanese educational system is similar to Germany's and
contrasts with the open system found in the United States and Norway, to pick two examples
(UNESCO 1996;Wickremasinghe 1992).
The second distinctive feature of the table is the gender difference, which is large for the 20–
30 age segment, and enormous in the 25–35 age segment. As noted above, when defining
“order” and “disorder,” the definition is from the perspective of the work sphere. The
reasons for the gender differences, of course, involve the mother and wife roles. Indeed it
can be argued that it is perfectly normative in the Japanese context of the last 20 years or
more for women to drop out of the labor force when they marry and start having children,
and that this is the expected sequence for adult women. But the view is quite different from
the perspective of the work sphere. As the sex role literature noted long ago (e.g. Corcoran
and Duncan 1979; Polachek 1975; Weiss and Gronau 1981; Wolf and Rosenfeld 1978) the
labor market punishes, in both wages and job advancement, those who drop out of the labor
market even for a short period.
We also note that 82 percent of the men in the 25–35 age segment were working full-time
during the entire 11-year period (not shown in Table 5). Depending on the birth cohort, this
spans the years 1980–2000. During at least 10 of those years Japan experienced severe
economic slump, and yet more than four-fifths of the young men were steadily employed the
entire period4.
In Table 5, nine percent of the men in both the 20–30 and 25–35 age groups experienced a
spell of being neither employed nor in school. While relatively small compared to women, it
is higher than one might expect from examining government cross-sectional figures. We
examined what factors available in our data set might distinguish them from the 91 percent
with orderly work sphere trajectories. The only consistent factor was education. Specifically,
those with the least education, that is they did not finish high school, are the most likely to
have experienced a spell of not being in school or in the labor force, and this is not
surprising.
4In interpreting this, two things need to be kept in mind. First, we do not know if these were “regular” jobs, that is, jobs with fringe
benefits and falling under the lifetime employment model. Second, because we have annual data, some might have had a relatively
short spell of unemployment.
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Again the question arises as how the patterns in Table 5 might compare to other countries,
and again precise comparisons are not possible. However, some comparisons are possible
with results from the United States using the National Longitudinal Study of the High
School Class of 1972 (Rindfuss 1991). Using a similar definition of order as used here, for
the 12 years from age 18 to 29, only 41 percent of the males and 17 percent of the females
could be classified as orderly in the work sphere. Clearly Japanese men and women have far
more orderly young adult life courses from the perspective of the work sphere.
Another contrast is possible with Norway, a country where it is quite easy to return to school
after having dropped out and to do so multiple times. For the Norwegian 1964 birth cohort,
Kravdal and Rindfuss (2008) used data from the Norwegian population registers and they
report that for those who became parents, 21 percent of the women and 20 percent of the
men had a higher level of completed education at age 39 than when they first became a
parent – again a radically different picture than we see in Japan.
Discussion and conclusions
Our results show an interesting pattern of ordered young adult lives within a time period
when macro structural change has been substantial. The sequences we examined covered the
period 1980–2000. This is a period when educational levels were increasing, resulting in
later ages at leaving school and starting employment/careers. Labor force participation rates
of young women were increasing markedly, and the economy was restructured in a variety
of ways. Childbearing was being postponed and total fertility rates steadily declining.
Similarly, marriage was also being postponed and never marrying increasing. For example,
among men aged 30–34 in 1975, 14 percent were never married, and by 2005 this had
reached 47 percent (National Institute of Population and Social Security Research 2007a:
11).
Yet surrounded by this macro change in education and the economy, as well as marriage and
childbearing patterns, the life course sequences of young Japanese men and women are very
orderly. They finish school and then work for the rest of their young adult years, unless they
are a woman and become a wife and mother. They seldom have breaks in their education;
once they first leave school, they do not return. They seldom spend a year not in school and
not working, simply hanging out. In the family sphere, having a child outside marriage is
exceedingly rare, and divorce, while increasing, did not have a major impact on the young
adult life course. Instead, the dramatic change in the family sphere has been the orderly
postponement of both marriage and employment.
In describing the work and family trajectories of these cohorts as orderly, we need to point
out that there is the possibility that the extent of orderliness might be overstated. Our life
history data are yearly rather than monthly, and retrospective rather than from a prospective
panel design. So short spells of unemployment, for example, might be missed. Cohabitation
information was not collected5. In Japan, and especially for these cohorts, cohabitation
would be considered disorderly. Yet, even if we had monthly data and information on
cohabitation, it is likely that a picture of orderly postponement of both marriage and
employment would have emerged, and especially in comparison to what we see in North
America and many European countries.
What about change since 2000? There is evidence that cohabitation and divorce have been
increasing (Raymo, Iwasawa and Bumpass 2004; Tsuya 2006). Further, the recent world-
5A cohabitation history will be included in the next round of NSFEC data collection, and so we will be able to examine this issue in
future work.
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wide economic downturn has likely affected Japanese young adults. Are we likely to see an
increase in disorder in the Japanese life course? This is a question we plan to address with a
new wave of data being collected in 2009.
We were able to make some comparisons with the United States and one with Norway. The
comparisons were less than perfect in that they covered different ages and calendar years.
There were also differences in mode of data collection, sample sizes, and specifics of the
available information. Nevertheless, the contrasts are instructive. In both Japan and the
United States, the most common sequence is working the entire young adult period. Further,
both countries showed considerable diversity in the range of sequences. This is where the
similarity between the United States and Japan end. With respect to order and disorder, the
two countries are qualitatively different. With the exception of the wife and mother roles
interrupting the orderly work trajectories, Japanese experience orderly work and family
young adult trajectories. In the U.S., on the other hand, disorderly family trajectories are
common, and disorderly work trajectories are the majority experience. And in Norway,
unlike Japan, obtaining more education after the birth of a child is common.
It is unfortunate that we do not have comparable indicators and patterns for the
Mediterranean countries (Italy, Spain, and Greece). These countries are frequently grouped
together with Japan on a variety of factors including fertility patterns (Caldwell and
Schindlmayer 2003) and welfare regimes (Esping-Anderson 1999). Or to take another
example, Reher (1998) characterizes the Mediterranean countries as having strong family
ties – a description that would also be used for Japan. And Italy, like Japan, had low levels
of cohabitation and divorce compared to Western Europe and North America, but levels of
cohabitation and divorce have been rising in both countries (Castiglioni and Dalla Zuanna
2009). Given some of these broad similarities, it is possible that the trajectory patterns we
see in Japan might also be present in the Mediterranean countries.
What might be the implications of the Japanese trajectory patterns for future fertility trends
in Japan? Here we can only speculate, but given the trend in Japanese fertility, and its
implications, speculation seems justified. Consider several elements in the current situation
in Japan. The now traditional marriage package is one in which the wife is expected to quit
work, have children, care for the husband's parents especially if he is a first-born male, have
essentially total responsibility for child care and household maintenance, and not complain if
the husband comes home late at night. This is not an appealing bundle if women have other
options, and, given the macro changes in education and labor market, they now have other
options. Their education levels have increased (National Institute of Population and Social
Security Research 2007a: 175–176). Even if they still experience gender discrimination in
the labor market, jobs are available. If they live with their parents, and most do, they have
considerable disposable income. Both young men and women have resolved the competing
pressures involving a marriage package that does not appeal to women, the normative
imperative to marry and have a child, pressure to either be in school or employment (unless
one is a mother), and the norm of conformity by postponing marriage and parenthood.
Taken together, this would suggest continued low fertility.
Further, as we have argued elsewhere (Rindfuss and Brauner-Otto 2008), other things being
equal, the greater the flexibility in the young adult life course, that is, the ease with which
such roles as student, worker, spouse and parent can be sequenced in any manner to suit the
convenience of the young adult, the higher the level of fertility in a country. Given that the
Japanese educational system makes it difficult to drop out of school and then later return,
and given that the labor market structure makes it difficult to drop out of the labor market
and then return to a “regular” job (full-time, with fringe benefits and falling under the
lifetime employment model), the implication is continued levels of relatively low fertility.
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Continued postponement, and eventually not marrying or becoming a mother, has also
received media attention. For example, a book published in 2003, Makeinu no Tōboe
(Howlings of a Loser), by Sakai Junko, argued that childless single women over 30 should
be proud of the freedom and financial independence they have as a result of not marrying.
The book became a Japanese best seller and was widely discussed, favorably and
unfavorably, by other media. While unlikely to persuade anyone, such discussion might ease
further postponement, perhaps facilitating a long-term realignment of family and work roles
such that a significant fraction of Japanese women are either in school or working their
entire childbearing years, without marrying or becoming a mother.
Now let's return to the issue of whether, for women, dropping out of the labor force to
become a wife and mother is “disorderly”? The issue is more than simply finding the right
term. Rather it goes to the core of the macro level changes that have occurred in industrial
and post-industrial societies. The macro, transformational changes in the work sphere
discussed at the beginning of this paper have tended to produce for women (but not for men)
a divergence between the normative expectations in the education and labor market
institutions on the one hand and in the family institution on the other hand. This divergence
has been accommodated and worked out differently in various countries. The nature of this
divergence is that from the perspective of the education and work institutions, individuals
(women and men) are expected to stay in school until they finish their formal education and
to work continuously thereafter until retirement. Sanctions for dropping out of school or
work tend to involve labor force re-entry difficulties, and then, if a re-entry is successful,
sanctions include poorer options, less advancement and diminished rewards. In Japan, these
sanctions tend to be larger than in most of Europe and North America. From the perspective
of the family, women are expected to marry and then take major responsibility for rearing
children, and typically this means dropping out of school or the labor force. Doing so often
brings the rewards of praise from parents, other relatives and one's broader social network;
and failing to do so can be sanctioned by expressed disapproval by the same social network.
While we have no empirical evidence on the point, again in Japan, sanctions for a woman to
simultaneously be the mother of a young child and a full-time worker tend to larger than in
most of Europe and North America.
The result of the divergence of normative expectations in the labor market and family arena
for women is that, within a given society, the work and family spheres can have conflicting
norms on whether women should drop out of school and/or the labor force to rear children.
Different countries have taken different paths to resolving these conflicting norms, and the
resolutions can involve monetary child support, child care services, part-time employment,
flexible work hours and the like. In this paper, we have addressed the issue of whether a
woman dropping out of school/work is “orderly” or not from the perspective of the work
sphere. It is not absolutely necessary to do so – a family sphere perspective could have been
used. The important point, though, is that women and men are following very different
trajectories in the work sphere in Japan. In the work sphere, women are essentially
sanctioned for doing so and in the family sphere they are likely receiving positive feedback.
Moving forward, an important question is whether the normative conflicts over education/
work trajectories will be resolved, and, if yes, the nature of the resolution. The question is
important because its resolution will have substantial implications for Japan's educational,
economic and family institutions.
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Table 4
Life course pattern of stopping school, marrying and becoming a parent, Japan and the United States, females
Order of Events United Statesa Japan
Stop School, First Baby, Marry 4 1
Stop School, First Baby, Never Marry 4 0
Stop School, Marry, First Baby 30 47
Stop School, Marry, No First Baby 12 11
Stop School, Never Marry, No First Baby 19 41
First Baby, Stop School, Marry 2 0
First Baby, Stop School, Never Marry 3 0
First Baby, Marry, Stop School 3 0
Marry, Stop School, First Baby 7 0
Marry, Stop School, No First Baby 6 0




The United States numbers are from Upchurch, Lillard and Parris (2002).
b
Totals may not sum to 100 because of rounding errors.
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